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Households in developing countries use a variety of informal mecha-
nisms to cope with risk, including mutual support and risk-sharing. These
mechanisms cannot avoid that they remain vulnerable to shocks. Public
programs in the form of food aid distribution and food-for-work programs
are meant to protect vulnerable households from consumption and nu-
trition downturns by providing a safety net. In this paper we look into
the extent to which food aid helps to smooth consumption by reducing
the impact of negative shocks, taking into account informal risk-sharing
arrangements. Using panel data from Ethiopia, we ﬁnd that despite rel-
atively poor targeting of the food aid, the programs contribute to better
consumption outcomes, largely via intra-village risk sharing.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is generally acknowledged that developing and transition economies need
better safety nets (see e.g.Drèze and Sen (1990), World Development Report
2000/01). Current provision often takes the form of direct transfer program
such as the distribution of food-aid and public employment programmes with
in-kind wages. Their aim is to support the poor and vulnerable and to pre-
vent current and future deprivation and insuﬃcient nutrition1. Despite calls for
more long-term safety nets, they remain largely relief programmes, in response
to emergencies (Clay and Stokke (1991)).
The problems with food-based support programs and their eﬃciency in de-
veloping countries has received a lot of attention (for reviews see Ravallion
(1991), Clay (1986), Barrett (2001)). Much of this literature has been concerned
with questions about the programme objectives, their long-run sustainability
and dependency problems (Maxwell and Singer (1979), Ruttan (1993), Stewart
(1998), Barrett (2000)) or the incentive eﬀects of transfers on labour supply,
food production and other productive activities (Sahn and Alderman (1996),
Dorosh et al. (1995), Maxwell (1991), Maxwell et al. (1994), Mohapatra et al.
(1997), Barrett (1998a), Bezuneh et al. (1988)). Other studies try to quantify
the net transfer beneﬁts, taking into account the opportunity cost of time spent
on food-for-work (Datt and Ravallion (1994)). There is a sizeable literature on
the impact of ration systems and supplementary feeding programmes (Beaton
and Ghassemi (1982), Kennedy and Alderman (1987), Alderman (1991)). A few
papers have directly addressed the issue of nutrional impacts of food distribu-
tion and food-for-work programmes (Athanasios et al. (1994), Janyne, Strauss
et al. (1999)), while some have focused on the indirect eﬀects, such as on-farm
investment (Bezuneh et al. (1988), Bezuhen and Deaton (1997)).
In recent years the focus has been on problems related to the targeting
of transfers (Besley and Kanbur (1990), Sen (1995), van de Walle and Nead
(1995)). Building on the success of the Maharastra Employment Guarantee
Scheme, self-selection based employment schemes are often advocated as pro-
viding a partial solution to these targeting problems (Drèze and Sen (1990),
Ravallion (1990), (Barrett (2001), Alderman and Lindert (2001)). Empirical
work on rural data has tried to quantify these targeting issues and ask whether
the poor do obtain the transfers(Jayne et al. (2001), Teklu and Asefa (1999),
Ravallion (1990), von Braun (1995)).
To the extent that empirical research has focused on the impact of trans-
fers on the welfare of the poor, much of this work suﬀers from at least four
problems. First, many studies, especially those on food aid and food-for-work,
focus on whether the poor are reached or not, without directly evaluating the
1Diﬀerent terms tend to be used to describe the objectives of these programs. Often, they
aim to promote food security, which can be deﬁned as the freedom from the risk of insuﬃcient
nutrition, thereby avoiding current and future deprivation. Diﬀerent authors use diﬀerent
deﬁnitions. Reduced ’nutritional risk’ or ’vulnerability’ are used in a similar sense (Beaton
(1987), Morduch (1994), Maxwell (1996), Dercon and Krishnan (2000), Christiaensen (2000),
Barrett (2001)).
2impact on the livelihoods of the poor. Secondly, even if they do, they rarely
address the issue of the impact in terms of nutritional risk, and focus only on
the direct eﬀect on current incomes and nutrition, partly due to the lack of lon-
gitudinal data that can document vulnerability and welfare dynamics (Barrett
(2001)). Thirdly, and linked to this, they do not consider the presence of alter-
native ways of coping with consumption or nutrition shortfalls, such as running
down assets and relying on informal support networks (Morduch (1995), Deaton
(1992)). Any impact evaluation ought to take these alternatives into account
for they will aﬀect the sum total of support available: for instance, Attanasio
and Rios-Rull (1998) demonstrate large crowding out eﬀects. Fourthly, they fail
to acknowledge the econometric problems related to program placement eﬀects
(see Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) for a classic treatment). In particular, the
recipients of support may receive it due to certain characteristics, unobserved to
the researcher, that also aﬀect the recipients’ nutrition or consumption outcomes
thus biasing the results of the impact evaluation.
In this chapter, we study food aid distribution in rural Ethiopia, and try
to address some of these problems. As in other studies, we distinguish two
questions. First, what determines the allocation rule of food aid in Ethiopia?
By studying the allocation rule, we can also address the issue of whether food
aid is indeed used as a form of insurance and so, is responsive to negative shocks.
Secondly, what is the impact on consumption of food aid transfers? For this
question, we explicitly tackle the issue of how food aid might interact with
informal sharing arrangements within the village. (Issues related to the long-
term impact of the safety net, for instance, investment in productive assets, are
discussed in the chapter by Barrett et al. in this volume.)
Per capita GDP is estimated at about 140 US dollars per annum, child mal-
nutrition (stunting) is estimated at well-above 50 percent during the 1990s and
adult malnutrition is about 25 percent (World Bank (1999), Christiaensen and
Alderman (2001), Dercon and Krishnan (2000)). Furthermore, its population
lives in a highly risky environment: drought is a recurrent phenomenon, requir-
ing large public responses (as in 1994 and 1999) or, in conjunction with failing
public policy and war, triggering a large scale famine in 1974 and in 1984-85.
Ethiopia is also an important recipient of food aid, and is arguably increasingly
dependent on it. The World Food Programme estimates for 1994-98 suggest
t h a tE t h i o p i ai st h es e c o n dl a r g e s tr e c i p i e n to ff o o da i di nt h ew o r l d( a f t e r
Bangladesh). In the 1990s, volumes of food aid accounted for about 5 to 15
percent of production (Clay et al. (1998)). Food aid is largely distributed via
food-for-work programmes - the best estimate puts its share at 63 percent of
food aid, while the rest is largely distributed as direct (free) transfers. Food-for-
work and direct food aid distribution are virtually the only publicly-provided
safety net in rural Ethiopia. A few recent studies have documented and anal-
ysed the eﬀectiveness of food aid delivery, uncovering important deﬁciencies,
although the focus has largely been on targeting issues (Sharp (1997), Clay et
al. (1998), Jayne et al. (1999, 2001), Barrett et al. (2001)).
In the next section, we discuss food aid distribution in Ethiopia and the data
used in this chapter. In the third section, the village-level and within village
3allocation rule for food aid is analysed. In section 4, we present a theoretical
framework to test the impact of a safety net on households faced with income
risk. An empirical model is developed in section 5 and this is used in section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
Ethiopia oﬀers an obvious opportunity to study the impact of safety nets on the
household’s ability to keep consumption smooth. It is one of the highest recip-
ients of food aid and faces a harsh and variable climate. Both donors and the
government have committed themselves to forming a well-functioning safety net.
The Food Security Strategy (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1996)
distinguishes between food-for-work or other income generating labour schemes
(supplementary employment and income schemes), aimed at able-bodied adults,
and targeted interventions for especially vulnerable groups. They cover both
interventions in large scale crisis and programmes designed to reach particular
groups over longer periods. In practice, most interventions involve food aid. In
turn, food aid has long contributed to food supplies in Ethiopia. This depen-
dence has been exacerbated by the food shortages during the famine in 1984-85,
the increasingly desperate situation in many rural areas in the late 1980s, linked
to civil war and political turmoil. The annual volume of cereal food aid has typ-
ically been about 2,000 to 6,000 metric tons per year in the period 1986-1995,
representing about 5 to 15 percent of production. Even in average years, the
volume of cereal food aid in a given region can account for 25 percent or more of
total marketed supply of grain, increasing to up to 50 percent in drought years
(Clay et al. (1998)). A substantial portion (over 80 percent in bad years) of
food aid has been used for emergency relief purposes.
Food aid is usually distributed across across regions and districts by the gov-
ernment while the actual allocation to beneﬁciaries at the local level is decided
by local village oﬃcials. In rural areas, this will be the peasant association,
which is a local government institution covering one or more villages. For food-
for-work, self-targeting is not often used, but even if eligible, households must
still make a decision of whether to work or not. Alternative opportunities are
likely to inﬂuence this decision. Often, the workload related to food-for-work
activities is not clear while wages are typically rather high, and probably higher
than the opportunity cost of time. The result is that usually more people apply
for food-for-work than can be accommodated. In eﬀect, this means that the dis-
tinction between food aid and food-for-work is not as important as expected,
even though allocation rules diﬀer. This is investigated further below.
What is the evidence on the targeting of this food aid? Sharp (1997), who
reviewed a large body of evaluation studies and conducted several new case stud-
ies, found that food aid has been spread too thinly over too many areas and
too many people, particularly in recent years. There is little evidence of target-
ing speciﬁc areas. Furthermore, in most cases, participants are selected at the
community level, but there is a clear reluctance to select some households while
4excluding others, so that much larger numbers are involved in the programmes
than intended. The result is that, locally, targeting errors of inclusion (providing
aid to people who are not in the intended target group) are a greater problem
than errors of exclusion (failing to provide aid to the people who need it most).
The result is that often too little aid is provided to the poorest to make much
diﬀerence. A similar result was found in the sub-sample of the large nationally
representative HICES/WMS survey for 1995/96. A number of related studies
(Clay et al. (1999), Jayne et al. (2001)) ﬁnd that the most important factor
determining access to food aid was whether there was a programme previously
in the area, resulting in a serious regional bias of food aid allocation. Half the
food aid distributed went to households with more than suﬃcient food from
their own resources . It should be stressed that these types of ﬁndings are not
uncommon across other developing countries. Nevertheless, they appear to have
encouraged many donors to reassess their activities in these areas. Subsequent
careful econometric studies of food aid in Ethiopia (Jayne et al.(2002)) seems
to conﬁrm these patterns.
The data used in this paper come from three rounds of the Ethiopian Ru-
ral Household Survey, collected in 1994 and 1995. This is a panel data survey
collected by the Economics Department of Addis Ababa University in collabo-
ration with the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford University.
It covers 15 villages, representative for diﬀerent areas across the country, and
a total of 1450 households were interviewed. The attrition rate in this panel
is very low - about 2 percent per year. The survey has detailed information
on households, including consumption, assets and income, as well as the shocks
they faced. Furthermore, it contains detailed information on participation in
food aid and food-for-work programs.
Consumption per adult equivalent2 (in 1994 prices) is relatively low: about
80 birr on average, which was then about 12 US dollars per month per adult.
Using a local nutritional poverty line of 2200 Kcal per adult, this suggests that
about 40 percent do not get suﬃcient calories on average. Shocks are very
common, even in this short period and even, given that this was a relatively
good year. In about a quarter of the villages, a serious drought occurred while
diseases aﬀected crops and livestock in many others. The average household lost
several person days a month due to serious illness (more details are in Dercon
and Krishnan (2000)). Ability to cope with shocks is quite limited. Many
households reported episodes of serious hardship linked to shocks in the last
twenty years, related to drought, illness, policy changes and other factors: 80
percent of the sample suﬀered major economic hardship due to drought, mainly
during the famine of the mid-1980s.
Eﬀorts have clearly been made to supply the rural population with food
aid. But how eﬀective is it? First, in our sample we have a high percentage of
2The consumption data are based on summing and valuing food and non-food consumption
obtained via own production, the market and via gifts. It is expressed in real terms by using a
consumer price index, using the average household in the ﬁrst round as a base. It is expressed
in adult equivalent units using nutritional equivalence scales based on WHO data for East
Africa. All data issues are discussed in Dercon and Krishnan (2000).
5Table 1: Percentage of households receiving food aid per round in selected
villages
village name round 1 (1994a) round 2 (1994b) round 3 (1995)
Atsbi 64 6 52
Geblen 79 97 5
Ankober 09 8 0
Shumsha 96 80 62
Yetmen 00 0
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey.
Table 2: Percentage of households receiving food aid by poverty status
non-poor (t-1) poor (t-1) total (t-1)
no food aid (t,t-1) 52 22 74
food aid (t,t-1) 14 12 26
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey.
households receiving food aid or beneﬁting from food-for-work in the six months
before each round of the survey: about 20 percent in both rounds 1 and 3, and
even 39 percent in round 2. However, the spatial and temporal spread is very
large. In ﬁve villages (out of 15) programs are always present, while in 7 others,
there was a program in place some of the time and in 3 other villages, there was
no food aid at all. Furthermore, the coverage in terms of households changed
considerably over time. Table 1 gives the details for a few villages.
Clearly, one village (Ankober) had a program with virtually complete cover-
age in the one period, to disappear in the other periods. In Geblen, the program,
very active in 1994, almost vanished. Only in Shumsha, (not far from the tourist
destination Lalibela - a preferred destination of heads of mission and evaluation
teams of donors and NGOs), coverage was always high: in round 1, six agencies
are identiﬁed as giving food aid. Tables 2 to 4 give some indication about the
targeting of the programme. First, we look at whether the poor in preceding
period, labelled t-1 received aid during the period between two rounds t and
t-1. The poor are identiﬁed using a poverty line based on the cost of obtaining
suﬃcient consumption to yield 2200 Kcal per adult and with some allowance
for non—food expenditures. (Details are in Dercon and Krishnan (2000).) Eﬀec-
tively about 40 percent are poor in each round, although there is considerable
mobilit amongst who might be labelled "poor". Table 1 shows that of the 26
percent of households receiving aid, more than half were non-poor in round t-1.
In short, targeting is rather more inclusive than might be intended.
Table 3 examines the eﬀect of common shocks, namely village level rainfall,
and divides the sample into groups according to whether the rains in the six
months preceding a round are in the lowest tercile (worst rains), middle tercile
(median rains) and the best rain tercile, and by whether food aid was received.
The table suggests that, of those receiving food aid, most food aid went to
6Table 3: Percentage of households receiving food aid by rainfall experience.
worst rains median rains best rains
no food aid (t,t-1) 28 27 21
food aid (t,t-1) 82 1 3
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey.
Table 4: Is food aid targeted to the poor. Percentage of households receiving
food aid by agricultural shock experience.
worst shocks median shocks best shocks
no food aid (t,t-1) 27 27 21
food aid (t,t-1) 76 1 2
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey.
those households in villages which experienced the best rains, while the people
that did not receive food aid, also suﬀered worse weather. This description holds
true even if the comparison is with rains in the previous period and current food
aid. Finally, we also use information on overall shocks to crops, including plant
diseases and other idiosyncratic shocks. Households were again divided into
terciles by crop shocks and receipt of food aid and similar patterns emerge: using
simple descriptive statistics, the evidence suggests that the poor and vulnerable
are not clearly targeted. Of course, this is merely suggestive and a proper
evaluation requires more analysis to which we now turn.
3 Food aid allocation
In this section, we present some regressions describing the allocation rule used
f o rf r e ef o o da i da n df o o df o rw o r k ,b yp r o viding covariates of whether food aid is
obtained and how much aid is received. We use a straightforward reduced-form
regression, in which food aid is determined by by a number of household and
community characteristics, some time-varying, such as shocks, and others ﬁxed
over time. Jayne et al. (2002) conduct a similar analysis using a relatively large
nationally representative clustered sample collected in 1996. They have data
on a large number of districts (343) and 2796 households. Within each woreda,
a few clusters were selected from which households were chosen; these clusters
are 5 on average and substantially larger than a village. The large number of
districts allows detailed analysis of the allocation to districts but is less amenable
in describing the allocation within villages, since only a relatively small number
of households per cluster is selected. In contrast, our data consists of panel data
on 1450 households from 15 villages. The relatively limited number of villages
limits our ability to describe the allocation rules to villages but the rather large
random samples within villages allow us to describe allocation within villages
with more conﬁdence. The fact that we have panel data allows us to focus more
7closely on the role played by time-varying information. Since we ask the same
questions, we can and do compare our ﬁndings to those in Jayne et al. (2002).
The variables of interest are, whether food-for-work aid has been received
and whether free food aid has been received by the household. The model is
speciﬁed as a probit. A subsequent set of regressions explores the amounts re-
ceived (conditional on having received some aid). This is eﬀectively a hurdle
model3.T h eﬁrst set of regressions focus on within village allocation, controlling
for village level eﬀects. In particular, a set of village level time varying dummies
allows us to focus on the within-village allocation: given that the village gets
food aid, how is it allocated? The explanatory variables used are the same for
all speciﬁcations. We use real consumption per adult and a set of household
characteristics, such as the number of male and female adults, total household
size, whether the head has completed primary education, and the sex and age of
the household head. Since real consumption per adult may well be endogenous,
not least since it is measured at the same time as the receipt of the food aid,
we use asset variables (land and livestock per adult) as identifying instruments.
The use of consumption or asset variables allows us to investigate the extent of
income or wealth targeting observed in the data. Furthermore, we use a number
of idiosyncratic (or household speciﬁc) shock variables to explore the respon-
siveness of aid targeting to shocks: illness days lost per adult in the preceding
four months, an index of whether livestock suﬀered from disease (where "1" is
best) and an index of whether crops suﬀered in general from poor growing con-
ditions (again, "1" is best). These indices were constructed using a number of
questions related to speciﬁc problems experienced in the latest growing season
(details are in Dercon and Krishnan (2000)). A second set of regressions drops
the time-varying village eﬀects, and includes a number of characteristics at the
village level. Also included are whether the village had any all-weather road and
its distance to the nearest town, as well as the percentage deviation of rainfall
in the particular year (normal is coded as "1"). Table 5 provides descriptive
statistics.
The probability of receiving food aid or food-for-work is estimated using
a standard probit model, using the pooled data, with robust standard errors
corrected for village-cluster eﬀects4. Since we have panel data, this was also
estimated as a conditional ﬁxed eﬀect logit model. This allows a further focus
on time-varying information, including whether food aid allocation is responsive
to shocks. Where relevant, the results are discussed in the text. Table 6 provides
the results for whether any aid is received.
3An alternative would be to jointly estimate whether aid has been received and how much,
by using a Tobit model or a sample selection model. However, the former would constrain
coeﬃcients to be the same for both the decisions on whether and how much aid has been
received, while the latter would require identifying instruments to credibly estimate the ﬁrst
s t a g eo ft h em o d e l ,w h i c hw ed on o tt h i n ke x i s t ,o ri d e n t i ﬁcation by functional form which is
also not preferable.
4We estimated the models also as random eﬀects probit models, and the results are virtually
identical, including in terms of signiﬁcance. Since the models with time-varying village level
eﬀects did not converge always using this estimation method, we report only the pooled
regression results.
8Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: mean and standard deviation (n=3981)
mean std dev.
does the household receive any aid? 0.29 0.45
does the household receive free transfers? 0.18 0.39
does the household receive food for work? 0.11 0.31
free food aid per adult (1994 prices) 2.25 15.82
food for work per adult (1994 prices) 0.76 5.66
consumption per adult (1994 prices) 91.61 96.71
livestock per adult (1994 prices) 333.97 501.63
land per adult (1994 prices) 0.36 0.44
household size (no.) 5.15 2.20
number of male adults 15-65 years (no.) 1.55 1.16
number of female adults 15-65 years (no.) 0.96 0.19
male headed? (%) 0.77 0.42
head completed primary education? (%) 0.10 0.29
age head (years) 46.23 15.79
illness days per adult 0.62 2.18
rainfall index (normal=1) 1.13 0.26
%s u ﬀering below normal rain 0.34 0.47
crop shocks (%, best=1) 0.48 0.41
livestock disease (%, best=1) 0.83 0.28
village distance to nearest town (km) 9.18 5.06
village has all weather road? (%) 0.53 0.50
Consumption and aid per adult equivalent per month, in birr of 1994; aid is valued
at consumer prices; illness days suﬀered by adults per adult in the household; the
rainfall index is calculated as rainfall in the preceding agricultural year relevant to
the survey round divided by mean rainfall, minus one, and is measured at the nearest
meteorological station - mean values based on typically about 20 years of data; below
normal rain is deﬁned as rainfall below the long-term mean; crop shocks is a
subjective (self-reported) index of whether main crops suﬀered moderately or
severely from any type of damage (including pests or weather related), where no
problem equals 1 and 0 is total failure; livestock disease is a self-reported measure of
whether livestock suﬀered from serious disease between survey rounds, where 1
means no problem. Note that this means that for ALL shocks variables higher
variables mean better outcomes, with the exception of illness.
9Table 6: Determinants of receiving food aid (marginal eﬀects from probit model
with village-time ﬁxed eﬀects, robuts standard errors).
any free aid? any food-for-work?
marg eﬀect p-value marg eﬀect p-value
consumption per adult -0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.183
male adults 15-65 years (no.) -0.035 0.000 0.007 0.621
female adults 15-65 years (no.) -0.017 0.783 0.012 0.904
male headed? (%) 0.006 0.737 0.014 0.728
household size (no.) 0.001 0.943 -0.009 0.439
head primary education? 0.082 0.106 0.041 0.437
age head (years) 0.000 0.969 -0.001 0.210
i l l n e s sd a y sp e ra d u l t 0.001 0.545 -0.003 0.359
crop shocks (%, best=1) -0.013 0.570 -0.040 0.014
livestock disease (%, best=1) -0.025 0.621 -0.032 0.164
time varying village dummies not reported not reported
psuedo R2 0.69 psuedo R2 0.46
n=2447 n=1595
The underlying data set contains 3981 observations. However, since we use a binary
left hand side variable and time-varying ﬁxed eﬀects, all observations from villages
that have no food aid at all in a speciﬁc period would be perfectly collinear with the
village dummies and therefore cannot contribute to understanding the household
level determinants, and are excluded. The table reports marginal eﬀe c t sa st h e
derivative of the cumulative normal distribution at the mean of the right hand side
variables; for dummies the marginal eﬀect is expressed as the discrete change from 0
to 1 is reported. Real consumption is treated as endogenous using a two-stage
regression. Land per adult and livestock values per adult are identifying instruments.
10There is evidence of income based targeting within villages (controlling for
whether the village received aid). Evaluated at the mean of all other variables,
the probability of receiving free food aid increases from 5.8 percent at the 75th
percentile of consumption per adult, to about 18.6 percent at the 25th percentile.
Note that these marginal eﬀects are somewhat larger than in Jayne et al. (2002,
p.273). One reason may be that they analysed within-district allocation, and
that allocation from districts to villages was not as sensitive to incomes as
the allocation within villages. The other signiﬁcant eﬀect is that households
with more male adults are less likely to receive aid (with a 3.5 percent lower
probability per male adult), suggesting targeting towards children, elderly and
women. For food-for-work programs, the marginal eﬀect of consumption per
adult on participating is only very weakly signiﬁc a n t ,e v e nt h o u g ht h em a r g i n a l
eﬀect is relatively high again, suggesting some targeting (and contrary to Jayne
et al. (2002))5. Participation in food-for-work is sensitive to idiosyncratic shocks
to crops (at 1 percent) or to livestock (signiﬁcant at 16 percent) - suggesting
that food-for-work may perform some insurance function6. Whether this is
because people are selected to participate on the basis of a recent misadventure
or whether they are more likely to choose to participate if shocks occur cannot
be assessed. We also oﬀer two checks of the robustness of these results. First,
the consumption data contain information on the source of food consumption
items, including whether they were received as gifts from public sources. Since
current consumption per adult (even if instrumented) may already be boosted
by access to food aid, resulting in a spurious relationship, we used an alternative
consumption measure, excluding all consumption from public gifts. The results
were unaﬀected by this. Next, a conditional ﬁxed eﬀects logit model was run.
T h er e s u l t sr e l a t e dt ol i v e s t o c ka n dc r o ps h o c k sw e r ec o n ﬁrmed; but we did
not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect on consumption per adult. While this suggests
that the eﬀects on income targeting using pooled data are caused by missing
’ﬁxed’ attributes, correlated to consumption, the most plausible explanation is
that these variables are wealth-related variables, and that targeting may still
be sensitive to levels of wealth or income, but not sensitive to ﬂuctuations in
income7.
Table 7 describes similar regressions but with the levels of aid received as the
left hand side variable and the sample restricted to those households receiving
some aid of the relevant type. For those receiving aid, the amounts on average
are 13 percent of mean consumption in the case of free aid, and 10 percent
if food-for-work. The results suggest that although there is evidence of some
targeting in terms of whether people get support, in terms of amounts, the
better-oﬀ households do get more. At the mean, a one percent increase in
consumption results in one percent more aid. Male headed households get more
5Evaluated at the mean, the probability of receiving food-for-work goes up from about 2.5
percent at the 75th percentile to 16.4 percent at the 25th percentile.
6Including shocks without consumption per adult or the reverse in the regression did not
aﬀect the results.
7An alternative explanation is that a signiﬁcant part of the consumption ﬂuctuations are
related to random measurement error.
11Table 7: Determinants of how much food aid is received per adult (OLS with
village-time ﬁxed eﬀects; only those receiving aid), robuts standard errors with
cluster eﬀects).
how much food aid? how much food-for-work?
coeﬀ p-value coeﬀ p-value
consumption per adult 0.140 0.013 0.163 0.187
male adults 15-65 years (no.) -0.553 0.028 0.240 0.600
fem adults 15-65 years (no.) 1.351 0.713 2.826 0.136
male headed? (%) 1.669 0.030 -0.329 0.744
household size (no.) 1.382 0.298 0.348 0.658
head primary education? -4.007 0.150 1.733 0.647
age head (years) 0.190 0.160 0.119 0.155
illness days per adult -0.210 0.188 0.303 0.247
crop shocks (%, best=1) -1.294 0.043 0.740 0.470
lives disease (%, best=1) 2.149 0.010 -2.407 0.377
constant -29.470 0.191 -7.385 0.640
time varying vill dummies not reported not reported
R2 = 0.16 R2 = 0.76
mean= 13.01 mean= 6.95
n=698 n=363
Only for those households receiving aid. Real consumption is treated as endogenous
using a two-stage regression. Land per adult and livestock values per adult are
identifying instruments.
12aid, although more male adults in the household reduces the transfer. For those
participating in food for work, there is no evidence of income targeting either,
in terms of the amounts received. The evidence suggests some targeting of
households with more female adults, but this is weakly signiﬁcant In short,
even though there is evidence that within villages, food aid and possibly access
to food-for-work displays some targeting, the amounts received are typically
higher for the better-oﬀ households. These results are unaﬀected when using
an alternative deﬁnition of consumption, excluding food received as gifts from
public sources. Using a household ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimator, the ﬁxed eﬀects
are not signiﬁcant for free food aid, so that the pooled sample result of higher
amounts to the better-oﬀ stands, while for food-for-work, a signiﬁcant positive
relationship between the amounts received and consumption levels are obtained
as well, providing further evidence that among those receiving food-for-work,
the relatively better-oﬀ receive more.
Recall that all these results are conditional on village level eﬀects so that
they only reﬂect the allocation rule conditional on a village receiving aid.Next,
we consider the factors determining allocation across villages. We estimate the
regressions investigating the determinants of who receives food aid or food-for-
work again, but this time replacing the time-varying ﬁxed eﬀects with (instru-
mented) mean consumption per adult in the village in each period, village-level
rainfall shocks and the means of the other shock variables8. Table 8 gives these
results. The within-village eﬀects are largely similar to those in table 6 - in
any case, the results in that table oﬀer the preferred interpretation, since they
fully control for all possible village level eﬀects. While within the village, there
is evidence of income targeting in the case of free transfers and no clear tar-
geting for food-for-work, the evidence here suggests that better-oﬀ villages are
more likely to receive free aid, while there is only very weak evidence of tar-
geting poorer villages via food-for-work (both in terms of signiﬁcance and size
of the eﬀect). The probability of receiving free food aid increases for a house-
hold living in a village with mean consumption around the 75th percentile by
18 percentage points, compared to a household living in a village with mean
consumption around the 25th percentile. Furthermore, there is no correlation
with rainfall, and a positive correlation between (fewer) problems with crops in
the village, and receiving food aid. Households seem to be more likely to have
access to food-for-work if on average the village had more problems with crops -
suggesting that they are oﬀered as a safety net when problems occur. All these
results appear robust to alternative speciﬁcations, such as changing the number
of village level characteristics, deﬁning consumption so as to strictly exclude
food aid itself and ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations. Replacing consumption by assets,
such as land and livestock, showed that areas with more land per adult were
signiﬁcantly more likely to receive free transfers, while they were signiﬁcantly
less likely to receive food-for-work programs. In short, there is clearly no evi-
dence in favour of targeting of free aid programs to poorer areas in our sample,
8Adding the means of the other household level variables did not change the interpretation
of the results substantially.
13Table 8: Determinants of receiving food aid (marginal eﬀects from probit model
with village-time ﬁxed eﬀects, robuts standard errors).
any free aid? any food-for-work?
marg eﬀect p-value marg eﬀect p-value
village mean consumption 0.003 0.035 -0.001 0.198
rainfall (normal=1) 0.110 0.402 0.041 0.621
v i l l a g em e a nc r o ps h o c k s 0.454 0.000 -0.221 0.007
village mean livestock shocks -0.177 0.403 0.055 0.623
village mean illness days 0.225 0.001 0.082 0.002
consumption per adult -0.002 0.012 0.000 0.938
male adults 15-65 years (no.) -0.015 0.027 0.008 0.037
female adults 15-65 years (no.) -0.005 0.881 0.000 0.999
male headed? (%) 0.019 0.291 -0.011 0.465
household size (no.) -0.018 0.093 0.001 0.833
head primary education? -0.004 0.916 0.014 0.210
age head (years) -0.001 0.073 0.000 0.891
i l l n e s sd a y sp e ra d u l t -0.001 0.243 -0.001 0.362
crop shocks (%, best=1) -0.010 0.243 -0.014 0.000
livestock disease (%, best=1) -0.012 0.450 -0.004 0.505
psuedo R2 0.41 psuedo R2 0.19
n=3981 n=3981
The underlying data set contains 3318 observations. However, since we use a binary
left hand side variable and time-varying ﬁxed eﬀects, all observations from villages
that have no food aid at all in a speciﬁc period would be perfectly collinear with the
village dummies and therefore cannot contribute to understanding the household
level determinants, and are therefore excluded. The table reports marginal eﬀects as
the derivative of the cumulative normal distribution at the mean of the right hand
side variables; for dummies the marginal eﬀect expressed as the discrete change from
0 to 1 is reported. Real consumption is treated as endogenous using a two-stage
regression. Land per adult and livestock values per adult are identifying instruments.
but there is some evidence of targeting food-for-work, albeit relatively weak.
These results obviously need careful interpretation. The sample of villages
is relatively small, and although stratiﬁed to represent diﬀerent typical types of
villages, generalising about the village-level eﬀects has to be done with caution.
However, the samples within villages are random and relatively large, so that
the within-village processes may be well captured in this sample. Jayne et al.
(2002) have a much larger and random sample of districts, and their district-
level ﬁndings are likely to be stronger. They ﬁnd some income targeting in
both food-for-work and free food aid, but they ﬁnd it also to be rather weak
with very small increases in the probability of receiving food aid in a village
with mean income near the 25th percentile, compared to villages at the 75th
percentile. They discover some sensitivity to non-weather related crop shocks.
Both our results and the results in Jayne et al. (2002) suggest that targeting
14is, at best, relatively weak, especially across villages. Within the villages, both
data sets suggest targeting of (free) food aid, but the evidence on targeting of
food-for-work is weaker. However, whether food aid is targeted or not does
not necessarily measure fully the impact on households. In the rest of the
paper, we analyse this further, with a focus on the contribution of food aid
on the consumption path over time and its interaction with alternative means
of keeping consumption smooth such as informal reciprocal transfers between
households, expanding on Dercon and Krishnan (2003). To this end, we provide
a discussion of the theoretical framework for the analysis in the next section.
4 Food aid and risk-sharing
In order to analyse the impact of the safety net provision, we focus on intertem-
poral behaviour in the face of risk and the existence of community and household
based mechanisms to cope with the consequences of risk9.A s a b a s i s f o r t h i s
analysis, we use standard risk-sharing tests (Townsend (1994)). These tests
investigate whether outcomes over time in a risky environment are consistent
with those expected if markets were perfect, i.e. as if all risk is insured ex-ante.
This literature is less concerned with how this full insurance occurs - it could
occur through ’formalised’ market mechanisms or via ’informal’ sources, such
as mutual support within families or villages. The basis of the most standard
tests is to ask whether idiosyncratic shocks contain any information that could
explain consumption growth - under perfect risk-sharing they should not. Typ-
ically, perfect risk-sharing is rejected: results from a variety of contexts, such
as extended families in the United States, communities in India and nuclear
households in Ethiopia have failed to ﬁnd perfect risk sharing but do ﬁnd ev-
idence of partial risk sharing (Hayashi et al., 1996; Townsend, 1994; Dercon
and Krishnan, 2000a). This in turn suggests that there might be a substan-
tial role for interventions that might help households pool risk more eﬀectively
(Morduch, 1999). This would provide the support for more widespread protec-
tion mechanisms, including via food aid or food-for-work. Clearly, investigating
whether these programs indeed contribute to smoother consumption and more
risk-sharing is of importance.
However, standard models of transfers predict that private transfers will
be reduced if public transfers are introduced and there is some empirical sup-
port for this proposition as well (Cox et al., 1998). The presence of informal
risk-sharing arrangements has further consequences for the impact of formal
transfers. If households share risk, public transfers to speciﬁc households might
be treated like positive idiosyncratic shocks and hence, shared across house-
holds. If informal risk-sharing arrangements are self-enforcing, a formal safety
net could undermine existing informal insurance: any scheme that changes the
value of autarky relative to being in the scheme will aﬀect the degree of risk-
9Since for the empirical application, we speciﬁcally use household level data, we do not
consider intrahousehold issues in this model. For an analysis of these issues in the context
risk using the same Ethiopian data, see Dercon and Krishnan (2000a).
15sharing. The result may be less informal insurance and even result in making
some households worse oﬀ (Ligon et al., 2002; Attanasio and Rios Rull, 2000).
In short, introducing public safety nets might not have completely benign eﬀects
and hence taking explicit account of alternative mechanisms becomes critical.
In what follows, we focus on the impact of food aid on consumption. We do
s ou s i n gas p e c i ﬁcation that explicitly allows for the existence of a (perfect or
imperfect) informal risk-sharing arrangement in place. The null-hypothesis is
that there is perfect risk-sharing. In that case, food aid at the level of the com-
munity will have an impact, while, controlling for this community-level eﬀect,
transfers to speciﬁch o u s e h o l d sw i l lh a v en oi m p a c t ,s i n c et h e yw i l lb es h a r e d
across the members of the community. If food aid at the community level has
an impact after controlling for household level transfers, then this would be
evidence in favour for the existence of some sharing scheme within the commu-
nity. Indeed, it is diﬃcult to see why the consumption of all households in a
community would increase if positive transfers occur to some members, unless
it involves some sharing of these transfers within the community.
To test this formally, consider an endowment economy consisting of a com-
munity of N households, each household j with time-separable expected utility




ts) in which cj is a single consump-
tion good and z
j
ts are taste shifters, varying across households; both c and z
are deﬁned across T periods t and S states s.E n d o w m e n t si ne a c hp e r i o da r e
assumed to be risky. There is no storage, or contracting outside the commu-
nity. Let us assume that all households in this community eﬃciently share risk,
without commitment or information constraints, so that the problem can be
represented as if a social planner allocated weights θj to each household and
maximises the weighted sum of expected utilities (ignoring time preference for
simplicity), subject to the community-level resource constraint in each period t














in which πs is the probability of state s occurring. Denoting e
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aggregate consumption and endowments in the community in each state and
time period, the community resource constraint in each period and state can














More elaborate models including incomes, assets and production could be
deﬁned, but the key predictions from a perfect risk-sharing model would not
be aﬀected (Deaton 1992; Townsend 1994). Deﬁning µst as the multiplier on
the community resource constraint in each period and state, divided by the
16probability of the state occurring (πs), then the ﬁrst order condition for optimal













ts) denoting the marginal utility of consumption of household
j. Since the pareto weights are linked to a single consumption plan and since µst
only depends on aggregate, not household consumption, then only considering
interior solutions, this implies the standard perfect risk-sharing result: that the
growth path of marginal utilities of all households (ui0
ct) is the same and that it












In other words, whatever state of the world materialised, relative marginal
utilities are equal - with the lack of expectations operators the hallmark of full
insurance. The other key prediction is that the relative marginal utilities of two
households are a constant, the ratio of the pareto weights, irrespective of the
state of nature.
This assumes that the risk-sharing arrangement is perfectly enforceable.
There is a growing literature focusing on constrained eﬃcient contracts, en-
forced by the threat to leave the arrangement and return to autarky (Ligon et
al., 2002; Attanasio and Rios Rull, 2000). To characterise these arrangements,
one could start from (1) and (2) above, but add an additional constraint for
each household h, stating that in each period and state of the world, it must
be in the interest of the household to stay in the arrangement rather than re-
vert to autarky. These contracts still imply that risk-sharing will take place -
so that changes in the community resource constraint will still aﬀect the path
of household marginal utilities. However, anything that increases the value of
autarky relative to the value of staying in the contract will reduce the degree
of risk sharing. This means that shocks to individual endowments and incomes
may aﬀect the ratio of marginal utilities across individuals, despite the presence
of a risk-sharing arrangement.
These theoretical predictions have important implications about the impact
of transfers from a formal safety net (see also Ligon and Schechter (2002)). Risk-
sharing is not just concerned with negative shocks; the sharing predictions will
hold for positive shocks as well. Transfers from outside, such as food aid delivery,
are such positive shocks. Perfect risk-sharing implies that they are fully shared,
based on the pareto weights; if risk-sharing is imperfect, transfers from outside
will still be shared, but not necessarily fully. This has consequences for the
impact of targeting the poor and needy in safety nets. Table 9 summarises these
eﬀects. Suppose schemes target in order to reach the poor. Evaluating targeting
may be done by considering whether or not the poor are reached - if some of the
poor are not reached, we will call this a problem of exclusion. An alternative way
17Table 9: Targeting and informal risk-sharing).


































Note: exclusion refers to poor households who did not beneﬁtf r o mt h et r a n s f e r
scheme (in terms of higher living standards); excess coverage refers to non-poor
households who beneﬁted from the transfer scheme.
of evaluating targeting may be by considering the extent to which the non-poor
are covered by the scheme - a problem of excess coverage. The table gives the
matrix of possibilities: perfect targeting of the needy, imperfect targeting and
no targeting, when support is simply equally divided among households. We
consider the impact when perfect, imperfect and no risk-sharing takes place,
assuming that imperfect risk-sharing is linked to enforcement problems.
If there is full risk-sharing, targeting becomes irrelevant: any transfer to-
wards a household in the group, whether needy or not, is shared according to
the sharing rule underlying the informal arrangement. If there is no risk-sharing,
the ’standard’ results related to targeting are obtained: perfect targeting results
in full inclusion of all the needy in the scheme, and there are no non-poor in-
cluded. If all households receive a transfer, so that there is no targeting, then
there is no exclusion and full excess coverage. Under imperfect risk-sharing, the
results are less clear-cut: if targeting is perfect, the risk-sharing arrangement
may imply that some of transfer will need to be shared, although sharing will
not be perfect. Under no targeting, partial risk-sharing may also imply that
some of the transfer will be shared. In the end, who is covered or excluded
is not clear a priori, especially if targeting is imperfect. However, there is a
further issue: the incentives to leave the arrangement may result in exclusion
still to take place even if there is full coverage of the poor as in both the perfect
targeting or no targeting case, if some of the poor must use the positive transfer
to pay some of the non-poor to remain in the arrangement. The conclusion is
that the importance and consequences of targeting depend on the nature of the
informal risk-sharing arrangements. For example, even if targeting is relatively
poor, as appears to be the case in our data, and many of the needy are excluded,
the impact of the transfer program may be more positive due to the existence
of the informal sharing mechanisms.
185 Empirical model
Next, we derive an empirical model to investigate this further. Testable formula-
tions of the perfect risk sharing model can be obtained by assuming speciﬁc util-











which subscript s is dropped so that conventional notation is used), using loga-
rithms and allowing for measurement error ²
j
t in the logarithm of consumption,

















Equation (5) can be estimated using within (ﬁxed eﬀects) estimators, or
ﬁrst diﬀerences, so that the unobservable ﬁxed pareto weights do not aﬀect
estimation of the parameters of interest Equation (5) gives a useful basis for
a standard test of perfect risk-sharing. Suppose one can identify a variable
X
j
t that aﬀects the income or endowment of household j, then provided X
j
t
is cross-sectionally independent of z
j
t, θj or ²
j
t, then under the null of perfect
risk-sharing, lnc
j
t. should be cross-sectionally independent of X
j
t.
Idiosyncratic income shocks are thus useful candidates for testing risk-sharing,
provided that they are independent of current consumption levels.10 Most neg-
ative shocks typically used in the literature such as illness, job loss and agri-
cultural shocks would arguably satisfy this condition (Udry (1995), Dercon and
Krishnan (2000)). In this chapter, we use positive shocks, in the form of food aid
given to individuals in the village, as one of the idiosyncratic income shocks11.
Under perfect risk-sharing, positive shocks should also be shared and not af-
fect household consumption directly, but only do so through aggregate village
resources. However, food aid is typically not randomly distributed so the as-





θj is untenable. This is the standard program-placement problem of evaluat-
ing public programs. If aid is targeted to speciﬁc types of households - e.g.
those in poor areas or those headed by females, then without further controls
for program-placement, the impact of aid on lnc
j
t would be inconsistently esti-
mated in (5). However, if placement is determined by characteristics that do
not change over time, then estimating (5) by ﬁxed eﬀects removes the source of
inconsistency.
W eb e g i nw i t ha ne s t i m a t i o no f( 6 ) ,a n dregress the logarithm of consumption
on a set of time-varying community dummies Dt and a set of time-varying taste
shifters Z
j
t (which will be deﬁned below).ϑ
j is assumed to contain all time-
invariant taste shifters, the ﬁxed part of aggregate resources, ﬁxed placement
10The advantage of using shocks to income, rather than just income is that in many alter-
native models, predictable changes would have been taken into account in the consumption
path, and would therefore contain less information to reject perfect risk-sharing.
11In the evaluation of the impact of food aid, we do not distinguish between free food aid
and food-for-work. While there may be diﬀerent rules determining access to these diﬀerent
types of food aid, their impact on consumption is likely to be similar.
19eﬀects and the pareto weights.
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This regression is used to test perfect risk-sharing, using a set of variables
measuring idiosyncratic events aﬀecting income, such as illness, crop pests and
livestock disease Y
j
t ,a sw e l la sa i dA
j
t.T h ec o e ﬃcient, λ, should be zero under
perfect risk sharing, as should be δ,t h ec o e ﬃcient on idiosyncratic income. If
the hypothesis that λ =0(or δ =0 ) , is rejected, then perfect risk sharing is
ruled out. Does this then mean that no risk-sharing arrangement exists? Not
necessarily, but (6) cannot clarify this point. To test this we can ask whether aid
given to other people in the village aﬀects a household’s consumption. If so, this
would provide strong evidence of some sharing arrangement, whether perfect or
imperfect. In particular, it is unlikely that this eﬀect is caused by correlated
eﬀects - all households responding to higher food aid to some households by
independently increasing consumption, for example by depleting assets. Actual
transfers between households appears to be the most likely explanation in that
case. Finally, a prediction of constrained eﬃcient risk-sharing models, that a
change in the value of autarky aﬀects the degree of risk-sharing, can be tested
by investigating whether the impact of a reduction in idiosyncratic income is
higher in communities with substantial food aid compared to villages where
there is little or no aid.
6R e s u l t s
Tables 10 and 11 summarises the econometric tests (discussed further in Der-
con and Krishnan (2003)). We report the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, with robust
standard errors. Idiosyncratic income determinants included are whether aid
was received by the household as well as other indices of shocks, including the
self-reported measure of shocks to crops, livestock disease and illness. These
alternative sources of shocks are introduced as control variables, to isolate the
impact of aid. Household composition and the sex of the household head (with
changes mainly due to seasonal migration or death) are used as taste shifters.
We begin with a test of the perfect risk-sharing model, with all aggregate re-
sources summarised as time-varying village level dummies. We measure the
impact of aid in two diﬀerent ways: as a dummy for whether the household
received any aid, as well as the logarithm of the level of aid received. Table 10,
columns 1 and 2, suggest that the perfect risk sharing model is rejected in either
case, since controlling for time-varying community ﬁxed eﬀects, aid as well as
other shocks aﬀect consumption levels12. Column 2 suggests that a ten percent
increase in aid increases consumption by 0.8 percent.
Next we test whether there is actually any risk-sharing taking place. To
do this, we replace the community level variables by time-varying variables
12Note that the positive sign on crop shocks implies that worse crop conditions reduced
consumption.
20Table 10: Testing risk-sharing. Left hand side variable is log real consumption
per adult. Fixed eﬀects estimator with robust standard errors









crop shocks (%, best=1) 0.086 0.000 0.076 0.001 0.025 0.293 0.021 0.379
livestock shocks (%, best=1) 0.005 0.381 0.004 0.406 0.005 0.391 0.005 0.336
illness days per adult 0.061 0.116 0.062 0.108 0.002 0.963 0.032 0.337
rainfall index (normal=1) 0.465 0.000 0.433 0.000
rainfall index if bad (if <1) 0.316 0.000 0.240 0.000
aid dummy 0.130 0.000 0.090 0.001
ln aid per adult 0.082 0.000 0.051 0.009
village aid dummy 0.090 0.000
ln village aid per adult 0.124 0.001
ln relative price index -0.590 0.000
sex head (1=male) 0.131 0.318 0.162 0.206 0.194 0.146 0.223 0.102
household size (no.) -0.119 0.000 -0.110 0.000 -0.131 0.000 -0.119 0.000
crop shocks*village aid dum
livestock*village aid dummy
time-varying village dummies yes yes
R-squared 0.080 0.085 0.048 0.059
observations 3987 3985 3987 3987
21Table 11: Testing risk-sharing and crowding out. Left hand side variable is log






crop shocks (%, best=1) 0.034 0.328 -0.029 0.426
livestock shocks (%, best=1) 0.005 0.379 0.005 0.295
illness days per adult 0.066 0.123 0.052 0.251
rainfall index (normal=1) 0.425 0.000
rainfall index if bad (if <1) 0.324 0.000
aid dummy 0.111 0.000 0.053 0.054
ln aid per adult
village aid dummy 0.075 0.196
ln village aid per adult
ln relative price index -0.596 0.000
sex head (1=male) 0.133 0.310 0.240 0.135
household size (no) -0.120 0.000 -0.119 0.000
crop shocks*village aid dum 0.084 0.068 0.107 0.025
livestock*village aid dummy -0.020 0.558 -0.069 0.243
time-varying village dummies yes
R-squared 0.080 0.061
observations 3987 3985
22proxying changes in common resources. Deviations from normal rainfall levels
were included, expressed as actual levels divided by long-term mean levels minus
one. We allow for diﬀerent eﬀects on resources from ’better than normal’ rainfall
compared to ’worse than normal’ levels. For example, if savings are possible, but
credit markets suﬀer from imperfections, then it is easier to smooth in good years
than in bad years (Deaton, 1991). Therefore the regression includes rainfall in
general, as well as a separate measure of rainfall interacted with a dummy
variable that takes the value of one when the rainfall index is below 1, or below
normal levels. Hence, in bad years, the eﬀect of rainfall on consumption is the
sum of the coeﬃcient on rainfall and the coeﬃcient on rainfall interacted with
this dummy; both coeﬃcients are expected to be positive. All the regression
results conﬁrm this: below normal rainfall has a signiﬁcantly larger impact
than above normal rainfall. However, both eﬀects are substantial, consistent
with large weather-induced ﬂuctuations in consumption.
A further community characteristic included is whether more than ﬁve per
cent of the households from a particular village in the sample received food aid.
Testing its eﬀect gave a strongly signiﬁcant, positive eﬀect. However, it could
be argued that in areas with poorly functioning food markets, where arbitrage
happens slowly or not at all, the addition of substantial amounts of food aid to
supplies in a village may simply have relative price eﬀects, so that the impact
measured by this food aid at the village level is merely a price eﬀect, and
not evidence for risk-sharing transfers between households. To control for this
possibility, we include a measure of the level of local food prices, compared to
the average in the full sample: in short, as a control for local price movements
beyond inﬂationary trends in national food prices. Column 3 shows that this
has a strongly signiﬁcant eﬀect, and lowers the impact of the village aid dummy,
but the latter remains strongly signiﬁcant. This would suggest that some risk-
sharing is taking place and evidence in favour of the use of transfers between
households.
We explored this further using levels of food aid given to individuals and to
the community. To construct a measure of the latter, we calculated the total
volume of aid coming into the village per adult per month, using all reported
levels by the households in the sample. Obviously, since we work with a sample
of households (even if it typically constitutes about a quarter of the village),
measurement error may bedevil this estimate. Even so, we found that both
individual and community level aid have a positive impact on consumption, al-
beit that the community level impact is small (0.022) but it is only signiﬁcant
at 14 per cent. To address measurement error we can make use of an alter-
native measure of aid ﬂows that might be used as an instrument to tackle the
measurement issue further. Our measure of food aid coming in is based on a
question asking for receipts of aid between the survey rounds - typically about
5 months. However, in the consumption questionnaire, food aid received from
public sources is recorded again with a recall period of 7 days. Since this is
an independent measure of the food aid variable, obviously correlated with the
measure from the consumption ﬁles, we can use this measure as an identifying
instrument for household and community level food aid received. The results
23a r er e p o r t e di nc o l u m n4 ,a n da se x p e c t e d ,b o t ht h es i z ea n ds i g n i ﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients increases, especially the community level eﬀect. In short, food aid
coming into the village seems to be shared to some extent.
Finally, we test whether there is any evidence of pressure on informal risk-
sharing arrangements due to the presence of food aid. To investigate this, we
use the same regression as in columns 1 and 3 of table 10, but this time we
include an interaction between idiosyncratic shocks that are clearly observable:
viz. crop shocks and livestock shocks, and interact them with a measure of
whether the village receives any food aid. Table 11 gives the results. The null
hypothesis of no impact on informal arrangements from food aid is that the
coeﬃcient on the interaction term of food aid with the idiosyncratic shocks,
is zero, i.e. there is no additional information in this extra term to explain
consumption (controlling for idiosyncratic shocks as before). Recall that in
column 1 (table 10), there was evidence of crop shocks not being fully insured
within the community. Column 1 (table 11) shows that the coeﬃcient on the
interaction term of crop shocks with food aid is positive and signiﬁcant at 7
percent, i.e. that there is a larger eﬀect of idiosyncratic crop shocks in these
communities than in those without food aid13. In fact, the evidence suggests
that this lack of full insurance only occurs in villages receiving food aid, while for
villages without food aid the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
as if in localities with safety nets some idiosyncratic shocks are not insured
anymore. This result is conﬁrmed (and signiﬁcant at 3 percent) in column 2,
where rainfall information is used as a direct measure of time varying village
level variables. This supports the proposition that food aid crowds out local
arrangements for insuring idiosyncratic risk.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
The focus here has been the impact of food aid on household consumption in
Ethiopia. We begin with whether there is any evidence of targeting of the
poor or of those suﬀering bad shocks. Futhermore, we attempt to assess the
impact of food aid on consumption outcomes. Our study is diﬀerent in that
it speciﬁcally tests the impact of food aid in a context of informal risk-sharing
arrangements. In particular, if households form part of such arrangement, the
issue of targeting of food aid is either irrelevant (if the arrangement is perfect)
or its consequences complex (if risk-sharing is incomplete). More speciﬁcally,
with imperfect risk-sharing, some of the aid coming into a community is likely
to be shared in the community, but at the same time, it is possible that the
food aid itself may contribute to the breakdown of these arrangements, since it
changes the autarky situation, i.e. the outcomes of households if they were to
be outside the informal arrangement. Furthermore, the fact that we have access
to panel data with time-varying food aid distribution allows us to deal with
13Given the deﬁnition of the interaction term, in villages with food aid, the total eﬀect
of crop shocks on consumption is the sum of the coeﬃcient on idiosyncratic shocks and the
coeﬃcient on the interaction term,
24the econometric problems related to the non-random placement of programmes
across households and communities.
The evidence suggests relatively poor targeting. Our results imply that
targeting of free food aid is relatively sensitive to income within villages but the
evidence of targeting of food-for-work is much weaker within villages. Across
villages, there is some evidence of income sensitivity of targeting of food-for-
work, but not of free food aid. Note that the nature of our sample means that
our results across villages are less reliable than our within-village results.
Next, when looking at the impact of food aid, we ﬁnd that there is some
within village-sharing of this food aid. As a consequence, this implies that the
relatively poor targeting is less a problem then standard analysis would have
implied. We ﬁnd that controlling for household level food aid, the fact that
there is food aid to some in the community has an additional eﬀect on con-
s u m p t i o na n dt h em o s tl i k e l yi n t e r p r e t a t i o no ft h i se ﬀect that transfers indeed
take place. Informal risk-sharing seems to result in better outcomes of the food
aid distribution scheme, compensating for some of the poor targeting involved.
Furthermore, we also evidence of some crowding out. There is evidence that
villages with food aid seem to protect each other less for idiosyncratic risk, com-
pared to communities without food aid schemes. In other words, this evidence
is consistent with weakening informal arrangements because of the presence of
a formal system.
This has some important implications for policy. In line with Jayne et al.
(2002), it would be helpful to improve targeting. Our evidence suggests that
the better targeting of communities will have to take precedence. Even if the
actual local level distribution does not appear to be based on self-targeting, the
presence of informal arrangements seems to contribute to some broader sharing
of the beneﬁts of food aid across a community. Note that this evidence of some
shared beneﬁts does not necessarily mean that the poor will in the end get most
of the aid; rather that it will be spread over a relatively larger number of people
than to whom it was initially given. Still, in our sample, we should remain
aware that the problem of across-village targeting is also one of timing and of
the volume of aid: the variation over time of food aid across communities (which
community gets aid when and how much) suggests that there is much scope for
improvement.
The issue of possible crowding out of informal insurance arrangements by
formal support programs is complicated, not least to resolve via appropriate
policy design. It is possible to design safety nets that would not induce welfare
losses or to minimise crowding out of idiosyncratic insurance. We can think
of at least two examples. Both involve ﬁnding ways to reduce the incentives
of participants to deviate from the arrangement due to the increase in autarky
values. The solution would be to make the safety net conditional on partic-
i p a t i o ni nt h em u t u a lm e c h a n i s m ,s ot h a tt h es a f e t yn e tw o u l db el o s ti ft h e
household were to leave the arrangement. The simplest form would be to give
the aggregate protection to the mutual insurance group. However, this would
require the safety net operator to be able to identify the group and monitor its
continued existence as a group. If the group cannot be observed or monitored,
25an optimal mechanism may be designed to induce the group to stay together
by allowing other group members to punish deviators by denying them aggre-
gate insurance. Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) discuss some mechanisms which
could deliver this outcome. In any case, current practices are far removed far
from these optimal mechanisms.
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